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1. INTRODUCTION
Under President Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of perestroyka, or re-
structuring, the Soviet government has decided to allow foreign invest-
ment in the Soviet economy. Western investors may now establish in-
vestments under the 1987 Joint Venture Decree' or the 1990
Regulation on Joint-Stock Companies and Limited Liability Compa-
nies.2 For most companies organized under these laws, success or fail-
ure will depend upon the ability of economic reforms to transform the
Soviet economy into a market economy and integrate it into the world
economy.3 Westerners seeking to invest in the Soviet Union must accept
that they are gambling on the eventual success of market reforms which
will span a generation.4
The performance of Western investment in the Soviet Union has
thus far been something short of spectacular. The Soviet government
estimates that up to seventy percent of joint ventures between Western
* Honors Program, Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; J.D. 1990,
University of Virginia; B.A. 1987 University of Notre Dame. The author is grateful to
Paul Stephan for his guidance and comments on this paper and thanks Paul Harter
and Adam Decry for their advice on an earlier draft. The author retains responsibility
for any errors.
I On the Establishment in the Territory of the USSR and Operation of Joint
Ventures with the Participation of Soviet Organizations and Firms from Capitalist and
Developing Countries, 1987 Sobranie Postanovlenii i Pravitelstva SSSR [SP SSSR] No.
9, item 40 (Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of Jan. 13, 1987), translated in
K. HOBER, JOINT VENTURES IN THE SOVIET UNION app. 3 (1989) [hereinafter Joint
Venture Decree].
I Regulation on Joint-Stock Companies and Limited Liability Companies, 1990
SP SSSR No. 15, item 82 (Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of June 15,
1990), translated in USSR LEGAL MATERIALS (V. Pechota & P. Pettibone eds. 1990)
[hereinafter Regulation on Joint-Stock Companies].
I Russian Roulette with Six Bullets, ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 1991, at 64-65 [here-
inafter Russian Roulette]. See generally Osakwe, The Death of Ideology in Soviet For-
eign Investment Policy: A Clinical Examination of the Soviet Joint Venture Law of
1987, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1989).
" Hertzfeld, Joint Ventures: Saving the Soviets from Perestroika, HARV. Bus.
REv. Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 80, 81.
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companies and Soviet firms will fail.5 Official statistics that list 2,800
joint ventures registered with Soviet authorities are somewhat mislead-
ing.' In reality, fewer than 1,000 of these joint ventures actually have
bank accounts7 and only a small number of these are operating, profita-
ble ventures.8 The majority of joint ventures are either fronts for Soviet
cooperatives that seek the tax benefits conferred on the joint venture
form9 or thinly capitalized brokerages for Western exporters that do
not manufacture anything in the Soviet Union. 0 Many other joint ven-
tures exist on paper only. 1 The few hundred joint ventures that have
successfully established manufacturing operations are grinding to a
halt. 2 Soviet customers that promised to pay joint ventures in hard cur-
rency have not been able to pay their bills.1" Moreover, these domestic
hard currency transactions are the exception; in order to earn hard cur-
rency, most joint ventures must still conduct export transactions' 4 'under
a strictly controlled export regime.'
The Soviet political situation is unclear,'" and it is likely that the
environment for investment will remain uncertain for some time.
17
Nevertheless, many Western business leaders have decided that the
problems of doing business in the Soviet Union are more than offset by
the opportunities presented there. 8 Some Western businesspersons
agree that sound reasons exist for investing now, rather than waiting
' Failure Rate for Western Joint Ventures in Soviet Union Seen Hitting 70 Per-
cent, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1603 (Dec. 6, 1989) [hereinafter Failure Rate].
I Russian Roulette, supra note 3, at 65.
7 Id.
8 See U.S. Firms Operating in Soviet Union Face 'Enormous' Problems, Expert
Says, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1484 (Nov. 15, 1989).
1 Russian Roulette, supra note 3, at 65.
10 Id. The capital structure for this type of brokerage or intermediary was out-
lawed in December 1988. However, a "grandfather clause" permits joint ventures reg-
istered before March 1989 to import goods manufactured outside the Soviet Union. See
infra notes 122-34 and accompanying text.
11 Russian Roulette, supra note 3, at 65.
12 Id.
Is Id.
14 Id.
's See infra notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
16 Schmemann, A Gain for Yeltsin: Marchers Face Kremlin's Huge Show of
Force without Violence, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1991, at Al, col.6.
17 Hertzfeld, supra note 4, at 84.
1C Commerce's Willkie Discusses Administration Efforts to Assist Reform in East-
ern Europe, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1308, 1309 (Aug. 22, 1990). See Hertzfeld,
supra note 4, at 80.
The Soviet Union offers Western investors the chance to reach a potential market
of over 280 million consumers. HOBER, supra note 1, at IX.G(1). The potential for
profit is enormous, especially in Russia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic Republics, where
there are tens of millions of cultured, educated, and motivated Europeans who need
virtually everything. Hertzfeld, supra note 4, at 84.
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for more economic stability in the future.1 Although conditions may be
more predictable in several years, individuals investing sooner will have
established an advantageous infrastructure with Soviet consumers and
Soviet partners. ° The decision to invest now with the proper strategy
could create a significant competitive advantage.21
For now, and for at least the next several years, Western enter-
prises investing in the Soviet Union must attempt to create their own
markets within an economy that remains largely subject to central
planning, with virtual or complete government monopolies on currency,
foreign exchange, and foreign trade. In order to survive in this environ-
ment, Western investors must tailor their businesses to operate within
the constraints of this economic system and prepare for the economic
turmoil that anticipated reforms are likely to produce.
During the next ten years, successful investment in the Soviet
Union will require a high degree of operational self-sufficiency within
the Soviet economy.22 This article discusses the Soviet system of central
economic planning and analyzes the ways in which it complicates the
task of integrating Western concerns into the Soviet economy. Economic
reforms over the past two years have allowed for a significant amount
of decentralization. However, with these reforms have come new ineffi-
ciencies as Soviet producers have engaged in hoarding and other
autarkic behavior. Rather than creating efficient markets, these reforms
appear to have compounded the problem of obtaining reliable market
information. Western investors must continue to rely upon personal
connections to obtain the supplies and services necessary to conduct
business operations.
The article will then consider the Soviet monetary system and de-
scribe the ways in which Western investors are affected by Soviet mon-
etary policy. The Soviet system of administratively set prices is a funda-
mental element of Soviet economic ideology. Price controls are
troublesome to Western investors because they distort the value of the
ruble in the domestic economy, prevent the formation of efficient mar-
kets, and conceal the effects of inflation in the Soviet Union. It is the
system of price controls that creates the necessity for the government
monopoly on foreign exchange. In turn, the Soviet exchange controls,
which render the ruble completely worthless outside the Soviet Union,
remain the most problematic aspect of investment in the Soviet Union.23
19 Hertzfeld, supra note 4, at 84.
20 Id.
21 Id.
:2 Id. at 81.
3 Id. at 82.
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Exchange controls cause problems for Western investors from the
very outset of a business venture. The Joint Venture Decree incorpo-
rates the official rate of exchange into its valuation provisions. These
provisions create difficult questions of valuation when Western inves-
tors bring their initial capital contribution into the Soviet Union. This
article will discuss some strategies for negotiating around the problem
of valuation. Until the ruble becomes freely convertible, Western inves-
tors will have to earn hard currency in one of three ways: a new system
of hard currency auctions, domestic hard currency transactions, or ex-
port transactions.
In the fall of 1990, the Soviet government proposed a system of
special hard currency auctions to be open as of January 1, 1991.4 The
system has yet to be implemented, but it is certain that the rate of
exchange will be very high.2 Unpredictability regarding the rate of
exchange and uncertainty as to the amount of hard currency that will
be for sale will subject every Western concern relying on these auctions
to a high degree of transaction exposure.26 Any profit in rubles could
easily be erased by exchange losses.2"
Another method of earning hard currency in the Soviet Union is to
negotiate transactions with Soviet parties who are willing and able to
pay in hard currency. 28 However, the current problem of delayed pay-
ments is indicative of the limited possibilities for such transactions.29
Too little hard currency is available, and those who possess it are gen-
erally unwilling to part with it.30
Most joint ventures must follow the third option and engage in
export transactions in order to earn hard currency."1 During the first
two years following the enactment of the Joint Venture Decree, many
24 Decree of the USSR President on the Introduction of the Commercial Rate of
the Ruble Against Foreign Currencies and on Measures to Create an All-Union Hard
Currency Market, reprinted in Izvestiya, Oct. 26, 1990, translated in Federal News
Service, Oct. 26, 1990 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file) [hereinafter Hard Cur-
rency Market Decree].
2" Keller, Soviets to Let West Convert Ruble Profits, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1990,
at Dl, col. 6, D25, col. 5 [hereinafter Keller, Ruble Profits].
28 See J. BUN, S. GREENBAUM & D. JACOBS, FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES AND
INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss 28-30 (1981) [hereinafter FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES].
27 U.S., Soviet Economists Consider Plan to Make Ruble Convertible by Year
2005, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1315 (Oct. 11, 1989).
2s On Additional Measures to Improve the Country's External Economic Activity
in the New Conditions of Economic Management (Decision of the CPSU Central
Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of Sept. 17, 1987), reprinted in
ECONOMICHESKAYA GAZ ETA, Oct. 1987, translated in HoBER, supra note 1, at app.
4(6) [hereinafter External Economic Activity Measures].
, Russian Roulette, supra note 3, at 65.
80 See HOBER, supra note 1, at IX;G(1).
8 Russian Roulette, supra note 3, at 65.
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joint ventures were organized as thinly capitalized brokerages, designed
to purchase Soviet products for resale on world markets for hard cur-
rency.32 However, in March, 1989, the Soviet government issued a de-
cree which restricts the possibilities for generating hard currency in this
manner.3 3 This decree limits joint ventures to exporting only those
goods that they have manufactured and importing only those goods nec-
essary for their own production. Because of this bureaucratic control
over foreign trade joint ventures can no longer export countertrade
goods. In order to earn hard currency on export markets, joint ventures
must now manufacture their own goods in the Soviet Union.
Over the next two years, the Soviet government plans to imple-
ment a program of currency reforms that will gradually free the prices
of certain commodities. 4 As the Soviet Union removes controls on the
procurement prices that the government pays to Soviet producers, the
producers will be able to demand higher prices for the products that
they sell to joint ventures.3 5 Every joint venture making purchases of
inputs will be subject to economic exposure as price controls at the pro-
duction level are freed. 6 Furthermore, the intentionally vague schedule
of price reforms described in President Gorbachev's economic program
will cause other problems for Western concerns. This schedule is
designed to counter strategic behavior on the part of Soviet producers.
Past experience has shown that advance notice of price reforms creates
a "domino effect."' 37 When Soviet producers receive advance notice,
they hold their goods off the market until the price increase goes into
effect. The policy of no advance notice will defeat this strategic behav-
ior. However, this policy will create planning problems for Western
concerns, by making it very difficult to predict the availability and cost
of necessary supplies. Therefore, Western enterprises should consider
the advantages of entering into relational contracts to reduce economic
exposure caused by President Gorbachev's program of price reforms.
This article will conclude by assessing the long-term potential for
Western investment in the Soviet Union under the current pace of
32 Hertzfeld, supra note 4, at 86.
8 On Measures for Regulation of Foreign Economic Activities, 1989 SP SSSR
No. 16, item 50 (Decree of USSR Council of Ministers of Mar. 7, 1989), translated in
HOBErR, supra note 1, at app. 22 [hereinafter Regulation of Foreign Economic
Activities].
3, Keller, Gorbachev Offers His Plan to Remake Soviet Economy, But Includes
No Timetable, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1990, at Al, col. 6, A8, col. 3 [hereinafter Keller,
Soviet Economy].
3' Keller, Malevolent Boomerang Rules Soviet Economy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22,
1990, at A6, col. I [hereinafter Keller, Boomerang].
36 Id.
37 Id.
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reform.
Most of the analysis in this article will focus on investments estab-
lished under the 1987 Joint Venture Decree. The Joint Venture De-
cree was the first of Gorbachev's economic reforms allowing foreign
investment, and the joint venture form remains the most common type
of foreign investment in the Soviet Union. The Regulation on Joint-
Stock Companies is new in comparison, and there has been little expe-
rience in its practical operation. In spite of some major differences be-
tween these two forms of investment, most of the economic analysis in
this article will apply to investments organized under either decree.
Where necessary, this article will make clear the distinctions that apply
to these different forms of investment.
2. CHANGES IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF CENTRAL
ECONOMIC PLANNING
For the great majority of Western companies coming to the Soviet
Union, the key to a successful investment strategy will be to achieve a
high degree of operational self-sufficiency within the Soviet economy."8
Vertical integration within the Soviet economy will limit dependence on
world suppliers, and thus minimize the expenditure of hard currency.
Shortly after enactment of the Joint Venture Decree, Western
business leaders recognized that the most daunting obstacles to the prof-
itability of any type of Western investment would be the problems asso-
ciated with integration into the Soviet economy.39 In theory, joint ven-
tures were to be exempt from the government's economic plan and
administrative price controls. 0 However, in practice, joint ventures had
to rely upon government entities that were subject to such bureaucratic
controls.4' Locating and gaining access to supplies and raw materials in
the centrally controlled distribution system was often very difficult. 2
Recent economic reforms have resulted in a significant degree of
decentralization, but rather than easing the problems of integration,
these reforms appear to have compounded them. Over the last three
years, the Soviet government has enacted decrees providing for the res-
38 Hertzfeld, supra note 4, at 81.
11 Recent Development, Foreign Investment: New Soviet Joint Venture Law, 28
HARV. INT'L L.J. 473, 477 (1987).
40 See Joint Venture Decree, supra note 1, at art. 23 (stating that the Soviet gov-
ernment "shall not establish binding planning tasks" nor guarantee a market for a joint
venture's products).
411 W. Surrey & V. Lechtman, New Soviet Joint Venture Law: A Political Curios-
ity or a Real Investment Opportunity?, PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD - PROBLEMS
AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1988, at 6-1, 6-9 (1989).
42 Failure Rate, supra note 5, at 1604.
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toration of some private property rights, as well as expanded possibili-
ties for private entrepreneurship. 43 New economic laws have authorized
the small-scale production of consumer goods and services, and granted
substantial economic freedom for privately owned cooperatives.44 In the
summer of 1990, the Supreme Soviet enacted the Law on Enterprises,
which contemplated new freedoms from the control of central plan-
ning.45 The Law on Enterprises described an operating environment in
which firms would determine their own output on the basis of demand,
obtain inputs on the basis of market purchases, negotiate credit terms
with suppliers, and set prices for their outputs on the basis of negoti-
ated sales contracts. 46 However, this law also contained an important
provision in which the state reserved the right to set contracts with en-
terprises and to determine prices where enterprises have monopolies
over certain sectors of the economy.47 Since monopoly relationships
predominate in the Soviet Union, this provision effectively preserves
centralized control over a large part of the Soviet economy.48
Approximately eighty percent of production in the Soviet economy
currently remains under central planning. 49 Additionally, one proposed
decree demands that all enterprises supply the centralized trading sys-
tem first.50 If implemented, this decree would reinforce pervasive cen-
tral planning in the Soviet economy.
51
The overall effect of these reforms has been a general collapse in
centralized control of the Soviet economy. 52 The system of centralized
allocation and distribution has broken down and the government has
not been successful in creating markets to replace the old system. "3
Rather than behaving as profit maximizers, Soviet firms are engaging
in autarkic behavior, such as hoarding and producing goods which
13 See Stephan, Perestroyka and Property: The Law of Ownership in the Post-
Socialist Soviet Union, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 35, 48-59 (1991) [hereinafter Stephan,
Perestroyka and Property].
44 Id.
45 Law on Enterprises in the USSR, 1990 Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Sovieta SSSR
[Ved. Verkh. Sov. SSSR] No. 25, item 460 (Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR of June 4, 1990), translated in USSR LEGAL MATERIALS (V.
Pechota & P. Pettibone eds. 1990) [hereinafter Law on Enterprises].
46 See Stephan, Perestroyka and Property, supra note 43, at 60; Law on Enter-
prises, supra note 45, at arts. 23(1), 24, 25(1), 26(1), 27(5).
41 Law on Enterprises, supra note 45, at arts. 23(2), 26(2).
48 Stephan, Perestroyka and Property, supra note 43, at 60.
4' Hertzfeld, supra note 4, at 89.
50 Russian Roulette, supra note 3, at 65.
51 Id.
62 Stephan, The Restructuring of Soviet Commercial Law and Its Impact on In-
ternational Business Transactions, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 89, 97
(1991) [hereinafter Stephan, Restructuring of Soviet Commercial Law].
53 Id. at 98.
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make economic sense only within the context of the bureaucratic system
upon which they depend for their own supply needs. 4 The resulting
misallocation of resources, shortages, and diversion of goods to the black
market are antithetical to the interests of Western companies that seek
to establish rational markets based upon supply and demand. The re-
cent trend toward entropy intensifies the information problem that
faces Western companies as they seek to integrate their business into
the Soviet economy. In this distorted environment, the personal connec-
tions of Soviet partners will be placed at a premium.
3. PRICE CONTROLS: THE STATE MONOPOLY ON CURRENCY
In a planned economy there is a fundamental conflict between
maintaining political control over economic decisions and having a sys-
tem of currency Which stands as a reliable store of value.55 Policymak-
ers in the Soviet Union have historically preferred political control over
a rational system of currency valuation. In fact, the original ideologues
of Soviet communism believed that their economy would work without
the need for currency. 56 Since the beginning then, currency in the So-
viet economy has been used by the government as a tool of political
control.
The necessity of strict government control over currency is an inte-
gral part of the economic ideology developed under Stalin. The Stalinist
economy was based upon four fundamental elements: state ownership
of the means of production, fixed prices bearing no relation to market
forces, enterprise performance evaluated in terms of gross qlantitative
output targets, and a centralized hierarchical administrative appara-
tus.5 Because the state owns the means of production, there are no
markets which might set prices. Without markets to set prices, profit is
a useless criterion for evaluating performance. Therefore, it becomes
necessary to impose quantitative criteria through a central administra-
tive apparatus to prevent managers from producing goods for which the
state pays the highest price.
5 8
Until last year, the Soviet government employed a comprehensive
system of administrative regulations that set all prices from the produc-
Stephan, Perestroyka and Property, supra note 43, at 61.
5 See M. LINDSAY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN GORBACHEV'S SOVIET UNION
193 (1989).
6 A. ZWASS, MONETARY COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST & WEST 2 (1975).
7 STEPHAN, SOVIET ECONOMIC LAW: THE PARADOX OF PERESTROYKA 7 (The
Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies No. 805, 1990) [hereinafter
STEPHAN, PARADOX OF PERESTROYKA].
68 Id.
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tion level5 9 to the retail level.60 Comprehensive price controls enabled
the government to override the market forces of supply and demand
and replace them with centrally preferred levels of production. Because
administratively set prices bore no relationship to market forces, no
benefit was gained from comparing the cost of raw materials with the
total proceeds from sales.
6" Without a meaningful concept of profit,
62
the Soviet economy produced notorious inefficiencies.6 3 Profitable enter-
prises were required to turn over their proceeds to the state, while los-
ing enterprises were guaranteed subsidies as long as they continued to
meet their production quotas.6" By ignoring the profit criterion and
evaluating performance in terms of gross output, the system punished
altruistic production and rewarded the wanton consumption of sup-
plies.65 Much of the central administrative system existed to suppress
the hoarding and underproduction that resulted from the skewed incen-
tives created by the system of price controls.6 6
In the fall of 1990, President Gorbachev issued a decree that or-
dered the removal of price controls for certain firms at the production
level, while leaving intact the price controls at the retail level.67 Analy-
sis of this decree reveals that it is not a genuine reform of pricing regu-
lations which will lead to the creation of markets, but rather a half-
measure which will likely increase the distortion that currently exists in
" The function of currency on the production level was limited to the tasks of
state cost accounting. ZwAss, supra note 56, at 4. The government used currency and
prices because they were the most convenient tool for accounting and control. LINDSAY,
supra note 55, at 193. In some areas of the economy, individual enterprises could meet
required levels of output without possessing any money at all. ZWASS, supra note 56,
at 4.
so The official policy has been to maintain constant prices for all goods, with the
specific aim of holding down the prices of commodities, such as food and housing.
LINDSAY, supra note 55, at 102. Although regulation of supply and demand is possible
for production enterprises having inputs and outputs specified by a plan, it is not possi-
ble to regulate consumer demand for commodities. ZwAss, supra note 56, at 16. No
laws control the spending of cash funds by private households. Id. Demand for con-
sumer goods is high and supplies are generally low. Id. at 3. But because price controls
keep prices low, price cannot serve an allocative function in the market. The resulting
imbalance between demand and supply creates chronic shortages in the consumer mar-
ket. Id. Thus, price controls are in large part responsible for the fact that there are very
few commodities of value for sale on the Soviet domestic economy.
61 STEPHAN, PARADOX OF PERESTROYKA, supra note 57, at 8.
61 See id.
63 Berman, The Possibilities and Limits of Soviet Economic Reform, in SOVIET
LAW AND ECONOMY 29, 31 (0. loffe & M. Janis eds. 1986).
" STEPHAN, PARADOX OF PERESTROYKA, supra note 57, at 8. These subsidies
currently cost the Soviet government 115 billion rubles each year. Soviet Prices: When
the Price Is Wrong, ECONOMIsT, Feb. 2, 1991, at 45 [hereinafter Soviet Prices].
:5 STEPHAN, PARADOX OF PERESTROYKA, supra note 57, at 13.
*6 Id.
67 Stephan, Perestroyka and Property, supra note 43, at 62.
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the Soviet economy.". During January 1991, wholesale prices rose by
an average of forty-five percent, while retail prices remained fixed.,
Consequently, state stores are now required to buy dear and sell cheap.
In order to remain viable, these stores will have to receive increased
subsidies that will add to, and perhaps double, the current subsidy cost
of 115 billion rubles.70 Fixed retail prices will continue to block the
flow of market information on consumer demand, and thus prevent the
formation of efficient markets. 71 The squeeze placed on retail sellers
will only exacerbate the current economic morass of misallocated re-
sources, shortages of consumer goods, and the diversion of goods and
services to the black market .
2
Even though Western investments are expressly exempt from the
Soviet system of administratively set prices, 73 price controls interfere
with the conduct of business operations because they destroy market
information on supply and demand, and thus inhibit the formation of
the markets that Western investors need. In addition, price controls
make it difficult to assess the economic value of any business endeavor
in the Soviet Union because they undermine the ability of the ruble to
stand as a reliable store of value 4.7 Future price reforms will bring with
them inflation and greater uncertainty, but that is the only way that
the Soviet Union will move toward a market economy capable of mul-
tinational economic integration.
4. THE STATE MONOPOLY ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE
The fundamental principle of maintaining fixed prices indepen-
dent of market forces made it necessary for the Soviet government to
enact a monopoly on foreign exchange.7 Price controls distort the value
68 Soviet Prices, supra note 64, at 45.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Stephan, Perestroyka and Property, supra note 43, at 71.
72 Id.
71 Joint Venture Decree, supra note 1, at art. 23.
"I Stephan, Restructuring of Soviet Commercial Law, supra note 52, at 100.
While the Soviet government has been printing unknown numbers of rubles, price
controls have squelched the effects of inflation in the Soviet economy. Roubles, Roubles,
ECONOMIST, June 17, 1989, at 15, 15-16. Even with the current price controls in
place, however, inflation in state stores increases twenty percent per year, and more
than fifty percent annually on free markets. Soviet Prices, supra note 64, at 45.
75 See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (discussing relational contracts).
76 On Transactions in Negotiable Valuables and on Payments in Foreign Cur-
rency, 1937 Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporyazhenii Raboche-Krestyankogo Pravitelstva
S.S.S.R. No. 8, item 25, (Decree of the Central Executive Committee and USSR Coun-
cil of People's Commissars of Jan. 7, 1937), translated in BusINEss TRANSACTIONS
wrrH THE U.S.S.R. 443 (R. Starr ed. 1975).
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of products in the Soviet economy and thus destroy any economic pa-
rameters that would facilitate a meaningful comparison of Soviet prices
with world prices. 7 By creating a system of exchange controls, the So-
viet government has designed artificial parameters for measuring the
value of exchanges across currencies.
The Soviet government maintains different official rates of ex-
change for different types of currency transactions. 78 For trade and in-
vestment transactions, the rate is 1.8 rubles to the dollar.7 9 It is under-
stood that this rate of exchange is not based upon the actual value of
the ruble.80 It is possible, however, to estimate the value of the ruble by
examining the average rate of exchange on the black market. On the
black market, a dollar trades at twenty or thirty times the official rate
of exchange.8 Western investors thus pay a high premium to convert
their hard currency into rubles at the official rate of exchange.
5. TRANSLATION EXPOSURE: How THE LAWS ON
INVESTMENT INCORPORATE THE OFFICIAL RATE OF EXCHANGE
TO REDUCE THE VALUE OF THE WESTERN PARTNER'S
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION
The Soviets desire Western investment for a variety of economic
reasons.82 Nevertheless, they have only grudgingly surrendered eco-
nomic control to foreigners. 8 The Joint Venture Decree still contains a
provision that evidences the Soviet desire to keep economic control in
7 Zwass, supra note 56, at 62.
7' For international statistical comparisons, the official rate is 0.6 rubles to the
dollar. Keller, Ruble Profits, supra note 25, at D25, col. 5. Tourists receive six rubles
to the dollar. Id.
79 Id.
80 See Rouble Trouble: Stepping Out, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 1989, at 62, 64.
81 Clines, Evolution in Europe, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1990, at A14, col. 4. Each
day, the ruble's value decreases as goods and supplies are diverted away from state
stores to deregulated markets. Id.
a" The Joint Venture Decree states the Soviet Union's desire to increase produc-
tivity, to attract foreign technology and expertise, to expand the export sector, and to
reduce superfluous imports. Joint Venture Decree, supra note 1, at art. 3.
88 As originally enacted, the Joint Venture Decree limited foreign equity to only
forty-nine percent and required that the chairman of the board be a Soviet citizen.
Joint Venture Decree, supra note 1, at arts. 5, 21. However, Soviet citizenship is no
longer a requirement for the chairman of the board. On the Further Development of
Foreign Economic Activities of State, Cooperative, and Other Public Enterprises, As-
sociations and Organizations, 1989 SP SSSR No. 2, item 7, at art. 31 (Decree of the
USSR Council of Ministers of Dec. 2, 1988), translated in HOBER, supra note 1, at
app. 5 [hereinafter Development of Foreign Economic Activities Decree]. Moreover,
foreigners may now own 100 percent of some business concerns. Decree of the USSR
President on Foreign Investments in the USSR, published in Izvestiya, Oct. 26, 1990,
at art. 2, translated in Federal News Service, Oct. 26, 1990 (LEXIS, NEXIS library,
Wires file) [hereinafter Foreign Investment Decree].
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Soviet hands. The Joint Venture Decree incorporates the official rate of
exchange into its valuation provision to insulate the Soviet partner from
a naked comparison with the value of Western capital. The Regulation
on Joint-Stock Companies also uses the official rate of exchange in its
valuation provision. Both of these provisions present difficult issues of
valuation that must be negotiated in the initial proceedings.8 4
5. 1. Reducing Translation Exposure: Negotiating Around the Valu-
ation Provision in the Joint Venture Decree
Article 12 of the Joint Venture Decree requires the USSR Minis-
try of Finance 5 to measure the capital contribution of the Western
partner at the official state rate of exchange. It provides that "[t]he
contribution of the foreign participant shall be valued . . . [with] the
value of the contribution being converted into rubles according to the
official exchange rate of the State Bank of the USSR on the date of
signing .. .. *"" Because the official state rate of exchange is artificially
low, article 12 operates to give Western partners less than their actual
share of equity in the joint venture. Article 31 of the Joint Venture
Decree provides that "[t]he profit of a joint enterprise . . . shall be
distributed between the participants thereof in proportion to their share
participation in the charter fund."8" Together, these provisions subject
foreign investors to a form of translation exposure that reduces their
fair share of equity, control, and profit share.
The extent to which these provisions unfairly reduce the value of
the Western partner's capital contribution depends upon the actual
value of the ruble. Perhaps the best way to assign a value to the ruble
is by comparing the official rate of exchange with the rates of exchange
on the black market and at previous hard currency auctions. The black
market rate of exchange is between twenty and thirty times higher than
See HOBER, supra note 1, at IX.F(1).
85 As of November 1990, the process of registration approval was transferred from
the USSR level down to the level of the Union and Autonomous Republics. Law on the
Fundamentals of Economic Relations between the USSR and the Union and Autono-
mous Republics, 1990 Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR No. 16, item 270 (Law of the USSR,
Apr. 10, 1990), translated in USSR LEGAL MATE IALs, supra note 45. However, the
Joint Venture Decree is USSR legislation, and thus remains binding on the Republics.
Joint Venture Decree, supra note 1, at art. 2.
S' Joint Venture Decree, supra note 1, at art. 12.
It is important to note that none of the valuation procedures actually require the
joint venture to convert hard currency contributions into rubles. The authorized fund
procedures merely measure the contributions of the respective parties at the official
state rate of exchange for the purpose of assigning their respective shares of equity.
87 Id. at art. 31.
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the official commercial rate of exchange,"8 while the currency auction
rate is approximately fifteen times the commercial rate of exchange.8
Consequently, where the Western partner's capital contribution is val-
ued at the official rate of exchange, a Soviet partner need only contrib-
ute about one-twentieth or five percent of the capital in order to receive
a fifty percent ownership interest. Western partners have the burden to
present evidence of the unfairness of this process and to negotiate for
fair valuation of their equity contribution."
Creativity is the key to successfully negotiating fair valuation of
the Western capital contribution. The type of negotiating strategy cho-
sen will depend upon the type of capital structure that the Western
investor desires. Although current Soviet economic laws place heavy li-
censing requirements on thinly capitalized brokerages,9 it is still possi-
ble to establish a company with this capital structure. Western investors
can use to their advantage the fact that thinly capitalized brokerages do
not require a large pool of operating capital. 92 The object is to contrib-
ute intangibles, such as intellectual property or management expertise,
and present evidence of their value on world markets. Then, by show-
ing that the official rate of exchange is approximately twenty times
higher than the actual value of the ruble, Western investors can obtain
fair valuation.
The same strategy should succeed when Western investors contrib-
ute hard currency or capital assets. Any discrepancy in the valuation
which disadvantages the Western partner can be corrected by negotiat-
ing the inclusion of a provision in the charter to pay exhorbitant com-
pensation to the Western partner. It may also be possible to correct the
8 Clines, supra note 81, at A14, col. 4.
89 See Keller, Ruble Profits, supra note 25, at D25, col. 5.
According to the assistant general counsel to Data General, Soviet negotiators
are willing to compromise and account for Soviet hard currency shortages and the in-
convertibility of the ruble. U.S. Business Officials Express Optimism, Concern About
U.S.-Soviet Joint-Ventures, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1385 (Oct. 25, 1989).
91 In the first two years following the enactment of the Joint Venture Decree,
many enterprises were organized as thinly capitalized brokerages. Hertzfeld, supra
note 4, at 86. These joint ventures purchased Soviet products for rubles and exported
them for hard currency. However, the Soviets have severely curtailed this form of oper-
ation by enacting a regulation that allows joint ventures to export only the goods which
they themselves have produced. Regulation of Foreign Economic Activities, supra note
33, at art. 8. In order to establish a joint venture as a brokerage, several licenses must
be obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. HOBER, supra note 1,
at VI.E(9).
" The Ministry of Finance has imposed a de facto minimum capitalization re-
quirement of 100,000 rubles for joint ventures. Telephone interview with Adam Deery,
White & Case (Dec. 31, 1990). The minimum capitalization requirement for joint-
stock companies is 500,000 rubles. Regulation on Joint-Stock Companies, supra note 2,
at art. 30.
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discrepancy by having the Western partner contribute one-third of the
capital initially, with the remainder to be contributed within the three-
year limit provided by the Joint Venture Decree. Then the investors
can enter into a collateral agreement 3 whereby the Soviet partner
agrees to waive the remaining obligation when it becomes due.9"
For at least the next several years, the companies most likely to
succeed will be those that are capitalized for production. 5 Because few
capital assets can be purchased with rubles,9" this type of investment
will require hard currency capital contributions. Again, Western part-
ners should argue for a better rate of exchange. However, if the rate
used for valuation is unsatisfactory, Western partners may achieve a
fair allocation of equity and control by convincing the Soviet partners to
reduce the value of their contribution. Under this scenario, the Soviet
partners would contribute most of their capital in the form of long
term, non-interest bearing subordinated debt.9" This thirty-year debt
would possess all of the attributes of equity except that it would not
count toward the percentage of ownership.
Where these strategies are impracticable, the Western partner
should negotiate directly with the Soviet government for a more accu-
rate rate of exchange in the valuation proceedings.9 Clearly, it would
be in the interest of the Soviet government to exempt such a venture
from the operation of the valuation provision in article 12 of the Joint
Venture Decree. Without such an exemption, the parties are unlikely
to undertake the joint venture.
9 The Ministry of Finance never sees this type of agreement, and therefore, no
official approval is necessary. Paul Harter, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Lecture on So-
viet Capitalist Business Transactions at the University of Virginia (Apr. 21, 1989)
[hereinafter Harter Lecture].
94 Little risk is involved in this scenario because the Development of Foreign Eco-
nomic Activities Decree provides that "the principal issues of the joint enterprise's op-
eration are decided at board meetings by consensus." Development of Foreign Eco-
nomic Activities Decree, supra note 83, at art. 31 (emphasis added). Thus, Western
partners can always veto the requirement that they fulfill their obligation.
" Hertzfeld, supra note 4, at 80.
98 Risk Rises in USSR, but Also Potential Reward: How Will Developers Re-
spond?, 1 E. Eur. Construction 5, 5-6 (1991) [hereinafter Risk Rises in USSR].
7 Harter Lecture, supra note 94.
98 See generally Fabri, Stability of Contractual Relations in Long-Term Trans-
national Agreements, 1987 AUSTL. MINING & PETROLEUM L.Y.B. 563 (discussing the
feasibility of direct negotiation with the national government for a more accurate rate of
exchange).
This form of contract between a transnational corporation and the Soviet govern-
ment has apparently never been signed. Lack of publicity does not mean, however, that
it has never occurred, since secrecy would benefit all parties involved. Telephone inter-
view with Adam Deery, White & Case (Mar. 19, 1990).
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5.2. A More Flexible Position on Valuation in the New Regulations
on Joint-Stock Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships
Recently, the Council of Ministers issued new regulations contem-
plating a more liberal form of investment in a decree entitled Regula-
tions on Joint Stock Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships."9
Some experts believe that this decree, if successfully implemented, may
diminish the importance of prior joint venture legislation.' For now,
however, and probably for the next few years, the joint venture form
will remain the only practical means of direct investment in the Soviet
Union.
The main problem with the joint stock company form is a lack of
supporting legal infrastructure.' For example, joint-stock companies
require stock issues, but no stock market presently exists in the Soviet
Union. 0 2 Before the joint stock company form will be feasible, the So-
viet Union will have to develop banking regulations, antitrust laws,
bankruptcy laws, and laws on credit and collateral.1
0 3
When investment in a joint-stock company becomes feasible, inves-
tors who choose this form of investment will find a valuation provision
similar to article 12 of the Joint Venture Decree. However, it is un-
likely that the provision will cause as many problems during the initial
negotiations. Article 16 of the Regulation on Joint-Stock Companies
provides that "[tihe participant's contribution, valued in Soviet rubles,
constitutes his share of the charter capital."'0" However, article 20
states, "[d]istribution to participants of net profit ... shall be made...
in proportion to the participants' percentage-shares in the charter capi-
tal of the company or shares of stock held by them, or according to
whatever methods are provided by the foundation documents." (em-
phasis added) 05 Under this provision, the Regulation on Joint-Stock
Companies allows for flexibility in the distribution of profits, regardless
of each participant's share of the authorized fund. The Regulation on
Joint-Stock Companies also permits the partners to assign control of
Regulation on Joint-Stock Companies, supra note 2.
100 Stephan, Restructuring of Soviet Commercial Law, supra note 52, at 91.
101 See Stephan, Restructuring of Soviet Commercial Law, supra note 52, at 91
(stating that details concerning the Regulation of Joint-Stock Companies remain
sparse).
102 Although a Soviet stock exchange was officially founded in Moscow on No-
vember 12, 1990, there has been no announcement when trading will begin. New Mos-
cow Stock Exchange Is Country's First Since 1917, Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1990,
at A20, col.5.
"I See Stephan, Restructuring of Soviet Commercial Law, supra note 52, at 92.
... Regulation on Joint-Stock Companies, supra note 2, at art. 16.
'05 Id. at art. 20 (emphasis added).
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the company in any manner that they desire. Article 4(a) states,
"[p]articipants of a company have the right to participate in the rian-
agement of the affairs of the company in accordance with the founda-
tion documents."' ' Nevertheless, article 16 of the Regulation on Joint-
Stock Companies is significant because a Soviet court is likely to inter-
pret the law literally should a dispute regarding ownership or control
arise. Thus, Western partners should be careful during the initial nego-
tiations to ensure that the agreed value of the capital contributions is
clear.
5.3. 100 Percent Foreign Ownership
Pursuant to a recent decree by Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev, it is now possible for Western investors to avoid the prob-
lem of comparing capital contributions by investing in a wholly owned
subsidiary.10 7 By electing this form, Western investors would escape
questions of valuation and would attain complete control over business
decisions. However, some serious drawbacks exist. Presently, economic
circumstances in the Soviet Union place a premium on political influ-
ence and personal connections. Without a Soviet partner, a foreign con-
cern will have difficulty obtaining essential supplies and gaining access
to land.108 Consequently, until the present distribution system is dis-
mantled, it will be better to invest with a Soviet partner who has a
personal interest in the enterprise.109
6. THE PROBLEMS OF EARNING HARD CURRENCY TO FINANCE
GROWTH IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY
The primary attraction of direct investment in the Soviet Union is
access to a market comprised of more than 280 million people who have
been starved of consumer goods.'10 In order to reach this market, inves-
tors must establish a vertically integrated company that is capable of
expanding its own markets within the Soviet economy. 11 The trouble
is that financing growth in the Soviet economy requires hard cur-
rency,112 and there is very little hard currency in the Soviet Union. The
10 Id. at art. 4.
'07 Foreign Investment Decree, supra note 83. Gorbachev declared that
"[i]nvestors (legal entities and private citizens) may create on USSR territory enter-
prises wherein foreign investments account for 100 percent of their assets." Id.
108 Telephone interview with Adam Deery, White & Case (Dec. 31, 1990).
109 Id.
110 HOBER, supra note 1, at IX.G(1).
... Hertzfeld, supra note 4, at 81.
.1. Id. at 89. See Risk Rises in USSR, supra note 97, at 6.
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key to a successful investment strategy will be to secure the hard cur-
rency necessary for expansion, without relying upon periodic infusions
of new investment capital from the West. A firm can already earn hard
currency by engaging in export transactions or by negotiating domestic
hard currency transactions. Soon joint ventures may be able to earn
some hard currency at public auctions. Unfortunately, all of these ave-
nues are limited by the present constraints of the Soviet economic
system.
6.1. Export Transactions
Absolute control over foreign trade remained in the hands of the
Soviet state from the late 1920s until late 1986.13 Through a series of
decrees enacted between 1986 and 1989, the government broke up its
monopoly on foreign trade.1 1 4 However, the actions taken by the gov-
ernment over the last few years have revealed a trend toward reinstat-
ing bureaucratic control over foreign trade.
The Soviet government has always recognized the need to allow
joint ventures to engage in export operations independent of the state
monopoly on foreign trade. Article 24 of the Joint Venture Decree pro-
vides, "[a] joint enterprise shall be granted the right to conduct export
and import operations independently which are necessary for its eco-
nomic activities .... ,1115 Export licenses were always required," 6 but
for more than two years after the Joint Venture Decree was enacted,
the government granted joint ventures relative autonomy in their im-
port and export operations.1 1 7 Export autonomy encouraged the forma-
tion of joint ventures that were organized as brokers and intermediaries
for export transactions. 1
In late 1988, the movement toward free trade reached its peak.
With the enactment of the Development of Foreign Economic Activities
decree, the Council of Ministers proclaimed, "[as of] April 1, 1989, the
right to directly perform export-import operations is guaranteed to all
enterprises, associations, production cooperatives and other organiza-
tions whose products (works, services) are competitive on foreign mar-
110 Stephan, Restructuring of Soviet Commercial Law, supra note 52, at 90.
114 Id. at 91.
"1 Joint Venture Decree, supra note 1, at art. 24.
116 Article 24 of the Joint Venture Decree provides that "[tihe import to the
USSR and export from the USSR by a joint enterprise of goods and other property
shall be on the basis of authorizations issued in the procedure established by USSR
legislation." Id. at art. 24.
117 See HOBER, supra note 1, at VI.E(9).
116 See id.
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kets.""' 9 Under this Decree, there emerged a proliferation of Soviet or-
ganizations, cooperatives in particular, whose primary business was to
broker export transactions. 120 Unfortunately, export transactions began
to deplete levels of consumer goods and raw materials which were al-
ready in short supply. As shortages became critical, the Council of
Ministers adopted a resolution that banned certain exports entirely and
placed heavy customs duties on others. 2 The resolution banned the
export of "colour and black-and-white television sets, household refrig-
erators and freezers, washing and sewing machines, clothing and foot-
wear for children, natural. and instant coffee, [and] sturgeon and
salmon caviar." '22 Additionally, the resolution placed 20 to 100 percent
customs duties on certain household goods, such as "vacuum cleaners,
mixers, coffee-grinders, irons, household radio-electronic equipment,
photo cameras, car spares and accessories."
1 2 3
On March 7, 1989, the USSR Council of Ministers issued the
Decree on the Regulation of Foreign Economic Activities which pro-
nounced a new general rule that "U]oint ventures, international corpo-
rations and organizations set up at the Soviet territory are allowed to
export only their own products (works, services) .. 124 Joint venture
agreements concluded after March 7, 1989 must now have the permis-
sion of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in order to
carry out intermediary operations.
The Regulations for Operation Licensing in the Foreign Economic
Relations of the USSR quickly followed.' 25 They authorized the pro-
mulgation of a list of goods of national importance which could only be
exported under licenses issued from the Soviet ministry that controls the
particular good, the Union Republic Council of Ministers, and the
USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. 2 ' This list includes
crude oil, petroleum products, coal, ore, precious metals, ammonia, syn-
thetic rubber, timber, cement, cotton, grain, fish (excluding sturgeon),
"I Development of Foreign Economic Activities Decree, supra note 83, at art. 2.
120 HOBER, supra note 1, at VI.E(9).
121 On Additional Measures to Regulate Exports from the USSR of Certain Con-
sumer Goods, 1989 SP SSSR No. 4, item 13 (Decision of the USSR Council of Minis-
ters of Dec. 28, 1988), translated in Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS),
Jan. 1, 1989 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Wires file).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Regulation of Foreign Economic Activities, supra note 33, at art. 8.
125 Regulations for Operation Licensing in the Foreign Economic Relations of the
USSR, 1989 Biulleten Normativnykh Aktov Ministerstv i Vedomstv SSSR No. 9, at 25
(Decree of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers
of Mar. 20, 1989), translated in USSR LEGAL MATERIALS (V. Pechota & P. Petti-
bone eds. 1990) [hereinafter Regulations for Operation Licensing].
126 Id. at arts. 5, 6.
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wine, and wild animals.117 The USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations is authorized to limit the volume of any export transaction
involving these goods. 2 Moreover, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Ec-
onomic Relations can set the price that the joint enterprise must pay for
the goods that will be exported.'2 Finally, the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations reserves the right to introduce "[c]onstraints on ex-
port and import . . . for specified periods of time . .. [on] individual
products (works, services) . . . when this is dictated by a balance of
payments situation, or other economic and political considerations...
))130
The impact of these licensing requirements varies from transaction
to transaction, but the net effect is to restrict severely the ability of joint
ventures to earn hard currency through the export of countertrade
goods or goods not produced by the joint venture itself.' Today, joint
ventures that rely upon export transactions for hard currency must be
resourceful enough to create their own production base in the Soviet
economy and manufacture goods of sufficient quality for sale on export
markets.
6.2. Domestic Hard Currency Transactions
The most limited way for a joint venture to earn hard currency in
the Soviet Union is through direct negotiation with a Soviet enterprise.
Under the External Economic Activity Measures, joint ventures are
permitted to negotiate "with Soviet enterprises and organizations . . .
[to] determine the kind of currency to be paid in settlements for the
products realized . . .. "s Under this provision, Soviet entities are enti-
tled to use their hard currency reserves to purchase products from joint
ventures.' This method of earning hard currency is limited because
most of the potential purchasers do not possess hard currency. Recently,
however, the Gillette Company has negotiated a joint venture with
terms providing for substantial compensation in hard currency."" Gil-
lette says it will be paid $100 million over five years in this venture to
111 Regulation of Foreign Economic Activities, supra note 33, at app. 22(9)-(12).
'" Regulations for Operation Licensing, supra note 128, at art. 6.
129 Id.
10 Regulation of Foreign Economic Activities, supra note 33, at art. 9.
131 HOBER, supra note 1, at VI.E(9).
132 External Economic Activity Measures, supra note 28, at app. 4(6).
13 Gabrisch & Stankovsky, Special Forms of East-West Trade, SovIET & E.
EuR. FOREIGN TRADE, Spring 1989, at 5, 65.
13 Putka, Gillette Negotiates Venture with Soviets That Has Provisions for Hard
Currency, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1991, at A9, col. 2.
1991]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
produce shaving products.1 3 5 Notably, this agreement has not yet been
approved by the Ministry of Finance. 3 6
6.3. New Hard Currency Auctions
By law, the ruble remains an internal currency."' Rubles cannot
be freely exchanged for hard currency. At one time, joint ventures could
repatriate hard currency profits only if they actually generated such
profits.138 Soon it may be possible, however, for all companies, includ-
ing Western concerns, to take their ruble earnings to special currency
auctions and bid on foreign currencies offered for sale by Soviet busi-
nesses and the government.139 Whether or not these auctions will pro-
vide a viable means of repatriating profits remains unknown. 4
Several unresolved aspects of the proposed system of currency auc-
tions must be clarified. The key question concerns the amount of hard
currency that will be available for exchange.141 According to Alek-
sander Y. Voitenkov, the Deputy Chief of Gosbank's foreign currency
department, most of the currency would be offered by Soviet exporting
enterprises with United States dollars and German marks on hand.
1 42
Deputy Voitenkov expressed uncertainty over the state's willingness to
contribute some hard currency from its reserves. 43 Western economists
agree that without the contribution of hard currency by the govern-
ment, the rate of exchange would be ridiculously low.'
44
Several factors support this conclusion. First, the Soviet govern-
ment has already permitted several currency auctions to take place
since 1988.145 At those auctions, only a limited number of bidders were
allowed to enter, and still the sales were made at 25 rubles to the dol-
lar.146 The unlimited number of bidders in the new auctions can only
decrease the value of the rubles. Second, joint ventures have been free
to negotiate contracts in hard currency with Soviet enterprises since the
enactment of the External Economic Activity Measures. 47 Experience
135 Id.
13 Id.
1M7 Berman & Bustin, The Soviet System of Foreign Trade, in BuslnSs TRANS-
ACTIONS wrrH THE USSR 27, 55 (R. Starr ed. 1975).
138 See Joint Venture Decree, supra note 1, at art. 32.
239 See Hard Currency Market Decree, supra note 24.
140 Keller, Ruble Profits, supra note 25, at D1, col. 6.
142 Id.
142 Id. at D25, col. 5.
243 Id.
144 See id.
145 Id.
148 Id.
147 See External Economic Activity Measures, supra note 28, at app. 4(6).
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demonstrates that only the exceptional Soviet enterprise possesses hard
currency, and these enterprises have been slow to part with it.
148 If
Soviet enterprises are reluctant to part with hard currency for the
purchase of goods or supplies made with Western technology by joint
ventures, why would they be more likely to part with hard currency for
rubles, even lots of rubles, that can only purchase the inferior goods
available at Soviet state markets? 1 49 The only way these auctions will
provide a reasonable rate of exchange is if the Soviet government con-
tributes some hard currency from its reserves.
The economic program set forth by President Gorbachev calls for
a gradual pace to a convertible ruble.'50 At the moment, the Soviet
Union is nearly $4 billion behind on its hard currency trade pay-
ments. 151 Under the present circumstances, it is clear that any currency
reforms that would allow free convertibility of the ruble would lead to
massive capital flight.' 52 Even when the new auctions open, the ruble
will only be partially convertible. Restrictions on convertibility are
likely to remain for several years, or at least until prices are freed
sometime in 1992.
7. ECONOMIC EXPOSURE
7.1. Economic Exposure: Increased Production Costs Due to Price
Reforms
The concept of economic exposure seeks to measure the degree to
which future cash flows will be affected by changes in the value of
currency.' 53 As the Soviet Union removes controls on the prices that the
government pays to Soviet producers, Soviet producers will be able to
demand higher prices for the products that they sell to joint ventures.5 4
Thus, every joint venture that purchases inputs in the Soviet Union
will be subject to economic exposure as price controls at the production
level are eliminated.'
55
Under article 26 of the Joint Venture Decree, a joint venture must
transact through a Soviet Foreign Trade Organization (FTO) to obtain
148 Copetas, Perstroika's Yankee Partner, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989, § 6 (Mag-
azine), at 20.
149 Newman, Beleaguered Bloc: As East Europe Opens to the West, Comecon
Seeks a Market Niche, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1989, at Al, col. 1, A18, col. 2.
150 Keller, Soviet Economy, supra note 34, at A8, col. 1 (box).
151 Farnsworth, President of Soviet Republic Seeks U.S. Business Defects, N.Y.
Times, July 30, 1990, at D12, col. 4.
" Keller, Ruble Profits, supra note 25, at D25, col. 5.
15' FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES, supra note 26, at 29.
154 Keller, Boomerang, supra note 35, at A6, col. 1.
155 Id.
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inputs.' 56 Soviet FTOs are supposed to negotiate contracts for supplies
in exchange for rubles or hard currency 157 on the basis of contractual
prices that "tak[e] into account world market prices.' 1 58 The purpose
of this provision was to prevent joint ventures from benefitting from the
subsidized prices at which inputs and raw materials are sold to Soviet
enterprises. 15 9 However, as a practical matter, Soviet FTOs have not
always been able to negotiate for world prices. Joint ventures would
learn the government procurement prices of inputs in their area and
then would offer to pay just above that level. As the government
removes procurement price controls and increases payments to Soviet
producers, the Soviet FTOs will demand higher prices. In the fall of
1990, McDonald's Moscow-based joint venture experienced a doubling
of production costs after the government increased payments to Soviet
meat producers.'8 0 All joint ventures can expect to face similar or even
greater increases as price reforms are implemented under President
Gorbachev's economic program.'
61
7.2. Advance Notice of Price Reforms and Strategic Behavior on the
Part of Soviet Producers; President Gorbachev's Plan to Defeat the
"Domino Effect"
Strategic behavior on the part of Soviet producers is a cause of
great concern in President Gorbachev's policy on price reforms. Experi-
ence has shown that advance notice of price reforms results in a "dom-
ino effect," because producers hold their goods off the market until the
increase comes into effect.'1
2
Last year, in an attempt to put more meat back on the shelves of
state stores, the Soviet government announced, in advance, its decision
to pay more generous prices to livestock farms that would contract with
the state in 1991."'6 The decision reverberated throughout the economy
and produced the opposite of the intended effect.'6 During the first six
months after the announced price reforms, the supply of meat to state
stores dropped sharply because farmers shirked their state quotas, say-
156 Id. at art. 26.
's See External Economic Activity Measures, supra note 28, at app. 4(6).
158 Joint Venture Decree, supra note 1, at art. 26.
151 Clement, Changes in the Soviet Foreign Trade System, SoviET & E. EUR.
FOREIGN TRADE, Winter 1988-89, at 6, 44.
1GO Keller, Boomerang, supra note 35, at A6, col. 1.
161 Id.
162 Id.
168 Id.
164 Id.
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ing their livestock for January 1991, when the prices would increase.'6 5
Lines at state stores grew and prices in the decontrolled farmers' mar-
kets soared.
1 66
In order to avoid a food crisis, the state yielded and raised meat
prices for all producers, effective October 1, 1990.17 But the lesson on
strategic behavior was not lost on President Gorbachev. In order to
overcome the potential for strategic behavior resulting from price re-
forms, Gorbachev discarded the 500-day crash economic program and
adopted a slower and more vague blueprint for decontrolling prices.'6
In his speech introducing his Economic Program, Mr Gorbachev
explained:
The most important thing is in one and one half to two
years, maximum, to ... stabilize the monetary system and to
strengthen the ruble, and on this basis to provide control
over inflation, control over the liberation of prices, over the
creation of conditions for economic incentives, activating the
mechanisms of market self-regulation.1
69
7.3. Problems in Planning Caused by the Policy of Unannounced
Price Reforms: Using Relational Contracts to Reduce Uncertainty
As price reforms enable Soviet prices to reflect the world market,
joint ventures will experience significant increases in costs of produc-
tion. Joint ventures will also face the uncertainty caused by the policy
of unannounced price reforms. For new joint ventures still in the plan-
ning stage, this uncertainty will affect negotiations that assign rights
and responsibilities in the production process.
Although it is common for the Soviet partner in a joint venture to
agree to provide inputs, it is possible for either partner to undertake
such an obligation. In structuring the joint venture agreement, partners
make capital contributions which align their interests. These capital
contributions serve as a bonding arrangement. The inability of either
partner to perform affects the interests of the other.' 0 Thus, regardless
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. The increased payments further heightened the already bloated budget def-
icit to levels estimated in excess of ten percent of the gross national product. Id.
168 Id.
'"9 Excerpts from Gorbachev's Speech, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1990, at A6, col. 1.
170 See Scott & Goetz, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089,
1131 (1981). However, it is possible to structure a joint venture in a way where failure
to perform the procurement of inputs would constitute default. See MacDonald, Joint
Ventures: Breakdowns and Repairs - Rights Upon Default, 1983 AUSTL. MINING &
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of which partner undertakes the obligation to provide inputs, the out-
put plans of the joint venture must be flexible in order to account for
the increased operating cost due to the inflationary effects of price con-
trol deregulation. This flexibility can be accomplished by executing a
relational contract.
17 1
The relational contract anticipates the future implementation of
price deregulation and provides for a quantity of output that maximizes
the expected value of the exchange at the time of contracting.' 72 This
result is achieved by structuring the agreement such that the volume of
inputs required is keyed to the contingent implementation of the price
deregulation. Assuming that the decontrolling of prices will increase the
costs of operation, and that a fifty percent probability exists that the
deregulation will occur during the life of the contract, quantity E will
represent the fixed quantity term that maximizes the expected value of
the exchange. See Figure 1. However, quantity E will always be the
"wrong" level of output. Whenever uncertainty exists, an obligation
designed to be optimal on average will tend to be incorrect under the
circumstances that ultimately occur.
173
If the deregulation is implemented, quantity Q1 will be the optimal
output, and actual profits will diverge from optimal profits by the
cross-hatched area A. If the deregulation is not imposed, optimal profits
will exceed actual profits by the shaded area B. The profits foregone in
either instance will constitute "error costs".' 7 4 The solution is for the
PETROLEUM L.Y.B. 209 (discussing possible ways to structure the penalty for default).
Briefly, these strategies include: (1) a clause that creates a debt obligation of the de-
faulter to the extent of the amount to be paid; (2) a dilution clause that reduces the
interest of a joint venturer who defaults in payment in accordance with a formula,
which is based upon the relative contributions to the joint venture by the defaulting and
non-defaulting parties; (3) a compulsory acquisition clause where the non-defaulting
parties receive an opportunity to acquire the defaulting party's interest in the joint
venture at a price determined by an arbitrator; and (4) a forfeiture clause in which the
defaulting party is divested of his interest in the joint venture without compensation.
Id. at 215-21. Note that in proposals (3) and (4), the remaining equity participants
would have to pay for the inputs themselves, and thus, they would not be much better
off than they were with their Soviet predecessor. See also Chambers, Joint Ventures:
Breakdowns and Repairs - Methods of Structuring a Joint Venture to Deal with a Co-
Venturer's Failure to Contribute to Expenditure, 1983 AUSTL. MINING & PETRO-
LEUM L.Y.B. 233.
... "In conventional contracts, the parties generally are able to reduce perform-
ance standards to rather specific obligations. By contrast, relational contracts create
unique, interdependent relationships, wherein unknown contingencies or the intricacy
of the required responses may prevent the specification of precise performance stan-
dards." Scott & Goetz, supra note 170, at 1092.
172 Id. at 1099.
173 Id.
174 Id.
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partners to agree to output level Q1 if prices are decontrolled, and al-
ternatively specify output level Q2 if no reforms are implemented. In
this way, the partners can avoid structuring an agreement which calls
for the wrong output.
8. CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed some of the ways in which the Soviet
economic system interferes with the conduct of business from the per-
spective of Western investors. Doing business in the Soviet Union is not
easy, and will not be easy for some time. Under the current economic
system, business transactions are inhibited by Soviet central planning,
price controls, exchange controls, and export controls. These elements
of the old system suppress free market forces and stifle productivity in
the Soviet economy. Until these economic laws are repealed and re-
placed with a free market system, the decision to invest in the Soviet
Union will require a full commitment to establishing a company that is
operationally self-sufficient, vertically integrated with reliable Soviet
suppliers, and capable of expanding in the Soviet economy without the
need for new investment capital from the West.
For now, the current body of restrictive economic laws will re-
main, not for ideological reasons, but because the current Soviet leader-
ship views them as a means of keeping a lid on political unrest. Ulti-
mately, central political control of the Soviet economy will collapse.
However, the collapse of central planning does not mean that the Soviet
economy will disintegrate. Even as the power of central leadership di-
minishes, stability in the management of particular enterprises
1991]
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grows.17 5 Many of the bureaucrats who headed investment negotiations
several years ago have themselves joined the joint ventures that they
helped envision.176 These new investments are bringing new informa-
tion systems, new managerial expertise, new technology, and new in-
vestment capital. Together with cooperatives, cities, local governments,
and governments at the republic level, these joint ventures will create
new arrangements for commerce and production. Those investors who
take the initiative will be able to make political connections and to es-
tablish ties with consumers that will result in a significant competitive
advantage as the Soviet Union creates a new capitalist economy, and
moves toward integration with the world economy.
175 Hertzfeld, supra note 4, at 84.
178 Id.
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